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Abstract
The study of strategic groups in the industrial organization and
strategic management literature has mainly focused on the identifica-
tion of strategic groups and its relationship with performance. In
this paper, questions regarding the existence of strategic groups,
limits on the number of strategic groups and measures of inter-group
and intra-group relative positions are raised.
A game theoretic model of a competitive industry addresses these
questions by examining the long-run structure of the industry through
the concept of equilibrium. Using structural stability concepts, a
sharp upper bound, akin to a benchmark, for the number of strategic
groups is derived. In addition, a number of indices are also proposed
to measure the distribution of strategic groups and characterize the
distribution of firms within a particular strategic group.

1.0 Introduction
Industrial organization researchers have stressed the importance
of market structure elements in explaining firm performance [Bain
(1968), Caves (1977), Scherer (1980)]. Conduct was ignored partly
because there were difficulties in obtaining information about firm
conduct but also because it was argued that market structure constrains
firms' discretionary conduct. Thus, structure causes all firms in an
industry to behave alike and, therefore, suggests that firms are homo-
geneous except for their size.
Hunt (1972) relaxed the assumption of homogeneity and showed that
in the "white goods" industry, the firms differed strongly in terms of
their strategic behavior. Firms which were similar in their strategic
behavior were clustered into groups which he called strategic groups.
Following Hunt, numerous studies have been performed on the subject
of strategic groups [Newman (1973, 1978), Porter (1973, 1979, 1980),
Hat ten (1974), Patton (1976), Oster (1982), Primeaux (1983a, b)
,
Fiegenbaum and Primeaux (1983), Hergert (1983)]. All these studies
attempted to identify strategic groups in various industries. The main
differences between them arise from the choice of methods used to iden-
tify and define strategic groups (see also McGee (1982), McGee and
Thomas (1984)). It is obvious from these studies that there is no one
way of defining strategic groups. In fact, the choice of the main
strategic dimensions for defining strategic groups should be strongly
influenced by the characteristics of the particular industry being
studied and the purposes of the study.
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This study considers the long-run structure of markets in a com-
petitive environment and makes use of the concept of equilibrium, as a
strategic benchmark, to resolve certain specific issues about strate-
gic groups. They are:
1) If there are strategic groups within industries, how many will
there typically be?
2) How can one measure the strategic distances between strategic
groups?
3) What is the relative position of a firm within a strategic
group?
This more focused analysis of strategic groups will be useful to
firm strategists since it predicts potential end-game positions (Porter
(1980), Harrigan (1980)). In addition, it can identify those strate-
gies which will be dominated in the marketplace. Thus, a firm will
be able to consider the gap between its current position and possible
equilibrium positions and decide whether or not to make some adjust-
ments to improve its strategic position [as in Karnani (1982)].
Such detailed strategic analysis can also develop an understanding
of the fundamental forces affecting market structure. Since strategic
groups are a structural element of an industry, just like other ele-
ments such as concentration ratios, barriers to entry and product dif-
ferentiation, the equilibrium characteristics of strategic groups'
structure can provide insights about competitive positioning and
industry evolution. From a public policy perspective, it can help
policymakers (e.g. , the FTC Anti-Trust Division) to decide whether or
not to intervene in the dynamics of a market. For example, a current
market monopoly situation may be analysed as leading to many strategic
groups in the long run.
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The organization of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, a
theoretical model, based on a game theoretic approach, will be developed
to describe the industry and its strategic groups. In Section 3, in-
sights about specific grouping issues will be presented. For example,
using structural stability analysis, sharp bounds on the number of
strategic groups can be determined. In Section 4, an example will
illustrate the main ideas of this paper together with a discussion on
the implications of the results in this example. Section 5 will sum-
marize and bring out the overall contribution of this study.
2.0 The Model
The basic industry model assumes that there are a number of firms,
each of which produces a single product for the market. Each firm's
product can be differentiated, but it remains a close substitute for
the products of the other firms. For example, in the micro-computer
industry, there are a variety of competitors, such as IBM, Apple, NEC,
Zenith, Wang and Burroughs with closely substitutable products.
The firms act as monopolists, as far as their customers are concerned,
and set prices; on the other hand, they compete amongst themselves for
the consumer demand since customers can easily switch from buying one
firm's product to another's. This economic market model was posited
by Chamberlin to capture the essence of product differentiation; this
market form falls in between that of pure competition and pure mono-
poly, and is aptly named monopolistic competition (Mansfield, 1974).
When the number of firms in such a market structure becomes small, it
is often referred to as an oligopoly.
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From an economics viewpoint, this market should be represented by
complete descriptions of both the consumer side and the producer side.
It is common in the strategic management literature to concentrate on
the firm, its aspirations, the variables under its control and those
not under its control. We will follow a similar modeling approach, but
will incorporate the consumer side by picking controllable and non-
controllable variables that appear to affect the customer's consumption
decision. For example, the customer may base his purchase on informa-
tion received about the industry average price, average quality, etc.
and these will figure in the demand or sales function of each firm
along with the individual firm's price and quality. This provides a
more complete approach to modeling the industry than those currently
used. Coincidentally , the current literature on strategic groups does
consider aggregate industry variables, such as industry advertising,
R&D, direct costs, etc., the underlying motivation being to describe
the strategic posture of each firm [Schendel and Patton (1978),
Galbraith and Schendel (1983)].
In order to model the strategic behavior of individual firms, cer-
tain basic elements will be used. They include goals/objectives, possi-
ble resource decisions and environmental constraints faced by the firm.
Our model assumes that there is a single objective for each firm, namely
utility maximization. While it is true that there could be a number
of goals, often conflicting, which motivate firms, the contention here
is that cost factors can be attributed to all the key goals and a net
benefit or utility function could be derived for each firm. For exam-
ple, the trade-off between market share maximization and return on
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investment maximization can be captured by structuring the utility-
function in an appropriate manner.
The firms' actions or resource decisions involve several control-
lable variables. These can be both strategic and operational variables.
They may include those that pertain to a customer's consumption deci-
sion, for example, price, advertising and service as well as those
that are a firm's internal variables, such as R&D, raw materials cost
and unit manufacturing cost.
The environmental constraints encompass those variables which the
individual firm cannot control. These non-controllable variables
will be chosen to describe the broad competitive environment of the
industry. They will also be chosen to represent those informatory
variables which are available to the consumer in making his purchasing
decision, such as industry average price and average quality.
Thus, the model is slightly more general than Galbraith and
Schendel's (1983) formulation. In their performance model, some of the
independent variables were structured relative to the industry aggre-
gate value (e.g., relative advertising, which is computed by dividing a
firm's advertising level by the industry aggregate advertising level).
In this formulation, the utility function includes separate independent
variables for the numerator and denominator of each relative value
measure (e.g., firm advertising level (controllable) and industry
average advertising level (uncontrollable) rather than the aggregate
level)
.
As an example of such a model, let the controllable strategic vari-
ables for each firm be research and development (R&D), capital investment
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(CI), advertising (AD), price (P), and quality (Q). Let the non-
controllable variables be the industry averages of research and devel-
opment (AR&D), capital investment (ACI), advertising (AAD), price (AP)
and quality (AQ). (See Galbraith and Schendel (1983) for more such
variables.) Each firm will take these non-controllable variables as
given and try to maximize its utility function:
U(P., CI., AD., R&D., Q., AP, ACI, AAD, AR&D, AQ)111 11
with respect to its controllable variables. In this model, each firm
will be assumed to be identical in terms of its resources and cost
structures. The function U is assumed to be continuously differen-
tiable in all its variables but not necessarily quasi-concave in its
controllable variables. An equilibrium for this market is a set of
strategies for each firm such that the outcome of the competitive game
is stable, i.e., in equilibrium, firm i cannot do any better than using
its equilibrium strategy given that its competitors are playing their
equilibrium strategies. This type of stability concept is called a
Nash equilibrium in economics and game theory. Even though this game
could have asymmetric equilibria when firms have different profits, the
model formulation focusses initially on symmetric equilibria since, a
priori, all firms have been assumed to be identical, i.e., the U func-
tion is the same for all firms and so are all the parameters of the
function.
3 .0 Structural Analysis
In this section, the model outlined in Section 2 will be used to
develop insights about the following issues:
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1) Can more than one strategic group exist within an industry when
firms are modelled as being identical with respect to costs and
other parameters?
2) What is the largest number of strategic groups which may exist
in equilibrium when the industry matures?
3) Can strategic group concepts provide valuable insights about
industry structure?
4) How can the internal structure within a strategic group be
described?
3.1 The Existence of Strategic Groups
The issues associated with the existence of strategic groups are
first examined. Given the model, it is apparent that various kinds of
symmetric Nash equilibria may emerge. The symmetric equilibrium could
be a pure strategy equilibrium in which case all firms are following
the same strategy. Then, there is only one strategic group, consisting
of all firms in this equilibrium, and the strategy, which they all
follow, will also represent the industry average. On the other hand,
the symmetric equilibrium can be expressed in terras of mixed strate-
gies, which are essentially a probabilistic combination of pure strate-
gies. However, it is not reasonable nor practicable to expect firms to
behave as if they are tossing coins in making strategic decisions (and
also constantly changing them) in the real world. Therefore, the
interpretation of these mixed strategy equilibria will be that firms in
the industry will split into different groups, with each group using a
distinct strategy specified by the mixed equilibrium. The proportion
of firms in each group will approximate the probability assessment
assigned to the particular strategy used by the group in equilibrium.
So the concept of Nash equilibrium can, in itself, give rise to a
variety of strategic structures. If the utility function is such that
there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, then only one homoge-
neous strategic group emerges. But if the utility function allows only
mixed strategies in equilibrium, then the "invisible hand" of market
interaction forces several strategic groups to emerge.
3 .2 Strategic Groups: Stability and Equilibrium
In strategic analysis, it would be useful to predict the actual
number of strategic groups which may occur in equilibrium in a given
industry. In general, unless the exact functional form of the utility
function and specific values of the parameters are known, no such pre-
diction can be made. However, it is possible to predict an upper bound
for the number of strategic groups which may exist in an industry if
the number of uncontrollable variables in the utility function is known.
The general result is that if there are k uncontrollable variables in
the utility function, then there can be at most (k+1) strategic groups
in a "structurally stable" equilibrium (Kumar and Satterthwaite, 1983).
The version of this result for the specific model presented in Section
2 is stated as follows:
Instability Theorem : If the dimension of the uncontrollable variable
space (AP, ACI, AAD, AR&D, AQ) is five, then no mixed symmetric Nash
equilibrium with more than six strategies can be structurally stable.
and is proved in the appendix.
A.t this point, it is important to specify the difference between
a structurally stable and a Nash equilibrium. The notion of Nash
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equilibrium conveys a sense of stability of the following form: given
the parameters of the model, once every firm is playing its equilibrium
strategy, then no firm individually has any incentive to break away
from this equilibrium. The idea of structural stability argues for yet
another sense of stability, namely: given small shifts in the parame-
ters of the model, the Nash equilibrium structure changes only slightly.
This sort of stability ensures that small random fluctuations in the
environment will not make firms change their strategies drastically.
This concept of structural stability is taken from the field of dif-
ferential topology in mathematics [Guillerain and Pollack (1974), Chap-
ters 1 and 2] . Its relevance to the model presented here is obvious
since, in practice, the utility function, which is the fundamental
building block, can only be estimated within some non-zero margin of
error. Given small perturbations in the utility function, it is impor-
tant to determine whether the equilibrium, in these perturbed models,
is similar and close to that in the unperturbed model. If so, the
equilibrium in the unperturbed model is said to be structurally stable.
To understand how structural stability is maintained, the Nash
equilibrium structure should be examined. In the model, given the
uncontrollable variables (AP, ACI , AAD, AR&D, AQ) each firm chooses
values for its controllable variables (P., CI., AD., R&D., Q.) so as
l l l l l
to maximize its utility. Consider, for example, a particular Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies with the values of the uncontrollable
variables of the equilibrium position being (AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*,
AQ*) and two equilibrium strategies (aggregating to the averages
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defined by the uncontrollable variables) given by (P., CI., AD., R&D., AO .
)
J J J J J
j = 1,2. Due to their optimality, the utility associated with each of
the strategies, given the equilibrium value of the uncontrollable vari-
ables, is exactly the same or, to put it another way, the difference
in utility function values, at the equilibrium positions, is zero .
This equilibrium should be checked to see if it is structurally
stable. First, perturb the utility function, structurally, by a very
small amount so as to keep the values of the perturbed function, as
well as its derivatives, close to the corresponding ones of the origi-
nal function. Then, if the original equilibrium is structurally stable,
the perturbed utility-difference function will assume a value equal to
zero close to the original equilibrium specified by the uncontrollable
variables (AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*).
Further, to understand why there is a bound on the number of
equilibrium strategies, consider the following analogy. Consider three
straight lines, given by y. -a. + b.x, i = 1, 2, 3, meeting at a point
x*. It is quite obvious that there exist small perturbations such that
these perturbed lines do not meet at all . Consider a reformulation of
the above phenomenon: look at the difference function (yi~y2> ^2~^3^
which is a function of x only. Then this function takes on a value of
zero at x* and intuition tells that this happens very rarely. Notice,
on the other hand, that if there were only two straight lines, then the
intersection x* can be very stable. In this case, the difference func-
tion (y^'yo)* which is a function of x, takes on a value of zero at x*
and small perturbations can result in a zero value close to x*. The
difference between stability and instability lies in the dimensions of
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the range and domain space of difference function, i.e., dimension of
the range space [space of all values (yi~yo» y?~"^3^ can ta^e ^ = 2 in
the case of three lines, 1 in the case of two lines, and the dimension
of the domain of the difference function, i.e., dimension[space of all
values x can take] = 1 in both cases. It is true that when the domain
dimension is greater than or equal to the range dimension, the zero
value could be structurally stable (but not necessarily so: consider
a U-shaped curve just touching the x-axis—a perturbation of the curve
pulling it up uniformly misses the x-asix and thus loses the zero).
On the other hand, if the domain dimension is less than that of the
range, then _no zero value can be stable.
This intuition directly leads us to the instability result since
the dimension of the domain space is 5 (= dimension [space of all
values (AP, ACI , AAD, AR&D, AQ) can take]) and the dimension of the
range space is (k-1) if there are k strategies, i.e., (U-j-lL, Uo~^3'
.... U, ,-U, ) where U. represents the value of the utility function at
• k-1 k l r J
the ith strategy. The result is that if 5 < (k-1), then equilibrium
cannot be stable, i.e., there cannot be more than six strategies in a
structurally stable equilibrium.
3.3 Strategic Groups and Industry Structure
Given the existence of an upper bound on the number of strategic
groups in a stable equilibrium, the structure of this industry can now
be examined. Just like measures such as concentration ratios, several
measures which try to describe the nature of the strategic group struc-
ture (which is stable in the long run) can be defined as follows:
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1) The strategic concentration ratio SCR is defined as
SCR =
number of strategic groups making
up 80% of market share
total number of strategic groups
It measures the distribution of market share, in a similar manner to
the concentration ratio in Industrial Organization literature. However,
the major difference in calculation is that the groups are ordered in
terms of the total market share for each group and the SCR is then
computed—the closer SCR is to 0, the more concentrated the dominant
strategic groups are and SCR being closer to 1 implies market share
being spread out among the strategic groups.
2) Following Hirschman (1964), the strategic comprehensive index, SCI,
can be defined as
k
2
SCI = 1 - Z MSGT
i-1 X
where MSG^
^s (.^g raarket share of strategic group i. The SCI measure
is interpreted in the following manner. The smaller the SCI, the more
concentrated the market share is between a few groups and a high SCI
indicates a more dispersed industry.
3) The strategic distance matrix, SDM, can be defined as being the
matrix of distances between each strategic group. For example, if
there are three strategic groups, then
SDM =
d12 di3
d21 ° <*23
_
d31 d32 °
_.
which is a symmetric matrix (i.e., d.. = d..) and
d.. = distance from strategic group i to group j.
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The d. . can be specified in terras of a normalized Euclidean
distance measure based on the values of the controllable variables
at each of the strategic groups i and j and on the industry non-
controllable variables. For example, let (P., AD., R&D.) i = 1,2 be
two groups' strategies and the uncontrollable values be (AP, AAD,
2
AR&D). Then, two ways of defining d, 2 are
P -P
1 2
l
12 AP
AD
1
-AD
2
AAD
R&D -R&D
AR&D
and
12
"P -P 2 AD -AD 2 R&D -R&D
fJL-2] + f i 1) + f i 1)1 AP > l AP } K AR&D }
-, 1/2
4) Building on the previous measure, we define the aggregate strategic
distance, ASD, is defined as
k k
ASD = Z Z d
1=1 j-1
j>i
ij
which aggregates the total strategic distances between each group,
taken two at a time. A large ASD represents a more strategically
spread out industry than a low ASD. If distances were taken as a proxy
for mobility, the larger ASD would signify greater mobility barriers
than in industries with lower ASD (Caves and Porter, 1977).
In summary, these four measures try to characterize the strategic
group equilibrium, which obtains in an industry, with respect to market
share distribution (measures 1 and 2) as well as strategic distances
(measures 3 and 4). They can divulge important information for would-
be entrant firms as well as firms which may want to change their stra-
tegies.
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3.4 Internal Structure of Strategic Groups
Facing the question of relative positions of firms within a stra- -
tegic group, the assumption of identical utility functions for all
firms leads to the trivial result that all firms within a group behave
exactly alike, i.e., they use the same strategies. This assumption
is, of course, too strong. An example in the next section shows, as
expected, small asymmetric perturbations of the utility function do not
significantly alter the strategic group structure. Indeed the groups
are close to the corresponding strategic groups with identical firms.
It should be noted, finally, that measures similar to those pre-
viously defined for industries can adequately describe the structure of
firms within each group.
4.0 An Example
In this section, an example is presented to provide insights into
the concepts which were dealt with somewhat abstractly in the previous
section. The utility function will be assumed to be the profit func-
tion and its functional form given by
PR. -P. • S. - AD.ill l
where P. is the price charged, AD. is the level of advertising expendi-
ture and S. is the sales of firm i. The functional form assumes zero
marginal cost of production, but this is just for ease of exposition
—
the results do not depend on it. The sales function S. is assumed to
be:
P.
S. = (a+bAP) - (a+bAP)(a + 555-) (1 " ff)
-15-
with AP, representing the industry average price, which each firm takes
as a given. This sales function represents the classic downward
sloping industry sales function, i.e., when every firm charges the same
price, and the individual firm's sales function is more elastic than
the industry sales function. The sales of each firm can be thought of
as being comprised of two parts: one that is guaranteed to all firms
based on general consumer need/ industry average pricing and the second
which depends on interfirm competitive strategies. The sales increase/
decrease, due to strategic competition, is available only when firms
deviate from the industry average price.
Therefore, the firms are evaluated in comparison to the industry
average price. As a consequence, within the assumptions of the model,
increased advertising expenditure increases sales if the price being
charged is lower than the industry average and vice versa. This is
typical of situations in which competitive characteristics are similar
except for price competition; for example, Datril versus extra-
strength Tylenol, Compaq versus IBM PC, MCI versus AT&T and local
supermarket brands versus national name brands.
The values of the parameters of the sales function allow for sales
variations. For example a > 0, b < will enforce a downward sales
variation with increase in industry average price; ( a + _) < q 5 >
S > makes sure that the effect of advertising increases at a
decreasing rate and incremental sales can be achieved by pricing below
industry average and increasing advertising expenditure. Of course,
the level of this increase in revenue will have to be traded off
against the incremental advertising cost.
The profit maximizing conditions are:
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1™ = o => P* = ¥ [1 i
3 p 2
r
i v
and
3PR P* 8 < 0, AD* =
HI < => P*(a+bAP)(l - jj)
§
_ 1{dAU ^ (S+BAD*/ = 0, AD* >
Some differences between this model and that of Karnani (1982) are:
1) This model has two controllable variables which interact while
Karnani 's model uses only marketing expenditure. 2) This model assumes
firms are identical, to start with, regarding cost and proficiency
while Karnani 's model assumes firms are different. 3) Karnani con-
siders the firm's effect on the industry average while this model
assumes that each firm has negligible impact on the industry average.
This imposes the additional constraint on the model, namely that the
firm prices P. must average out to the same industry average AP used
to calculate the individual strategies.
What are the implications of this model? It can be easily shown
that, for certain parameter values, there is no equilibrium where each
firm uses the same strategies, i.e., follows the same price and adver-
tising expenditures. If it had existed, this would have meant that
there was only one strategic group. A heuristic explanation of the
non-existence of the symmetric equilibrium is the following: suppose
everybody was charging the same price P, then the industry average
would also be P and from the sales function, we can see that no one
will advertise (since it increases costs without increasing sales).
On the other hand, consider a firm in such an industry position—by
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reducing its price just a little below price P and increasing adver-
tising, it could very well increase its profits and market share (this
happens when 3/5*" is large). Then, such an industry position cannot be
in equilibrium.
The equilibrium position, which exists and is unique [see Kumar and
Satterthwaite (1983) for proof in a similar model] is one which has two
strategic groups—one group that prices lower than average and adver-
tises while the second group charges prices that are higher than aver-
age and does not advertise. For example, with a 26 , b = -2, a = -2.4,
5=3= 5/9, the Nash equilibrium strategies are (2.25, 3.5) for stra-
tegic group A and (4,0) for strategic group B, where the first number
refers to the price and the second, advertising level. Also, the
distribution of firms will be 57.15 percent in strategic group A and
42.85% in strategic group B, supporting an industry average price of
3
3. Each group achieves the same profit level of 64. Obviously, stra-
tegic group A has the larger market share (see Figures 1 and 2).
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
With respect to the questions on existence of strategic groups and
the actual number of them, this example shows how the market demand can
force the existence of strategic groups in equilibrium. There are two
of them, and it can be shown that they are structurally stable, thus
obeying the instability result. The instability result also stipulates
that this structure presents the maximum amount of strategic differentia-
tion possible, given that there is only one uncontrollable variable, AP.
How can we describe this strategic equilibrium structure using the
measures defined in the previous section? Here two measures are computed,
namely, the strategic concentration ratio, SCR, and the strategic
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comprehensive index, SCI, to represent the market share distribution;
and two further measures, the strategic distance matrix, SDM, and the
aggregate strategic distance, ASD, to characterise strategic distances
between groups.
The sales level for group A is 30 and that for group B is 16; with
57.15% and 42.85% of firms in groups A and B respectively, the market
share for group A is 71.43% and that for group B is 28.57%. Then SCR
is given as 1.0 and SCI is equal to 0.41. It is easy to see that SCR
is sensitive when the number of groups is small— it indicates no market
share domination by a small subset of the total number of strategic
groups. Obviously, this is not very accurate since one group has more
than twice the market share of the other. On the other hand, an SCI
value of 0.41 indicates unevenness in market share since otherwise, it
would be close to 0.5.
Using the absolute value measure, rather than the L«-norra (see
footnote 2), we obtain
SDM =
0.58
0.58
and obviously, ASD = 0.58 also. Therefore, the strategic distances are
quite small, measured relative to the industry averages for the strate-
gies. A possible interpretation is that there may be only a weak
barrier for firms contemplating a change to the other group.
The description of the relative positions of a particular firm
within each strategic group in this example is quite simple. Due to
the assumption of the same parameter values, i.e., a, b, a, 6, 3, for
all firms, all of the firms behave in exactly the same way within each
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group (see Figure 2). This seems a highly unlikely condition and what
one would expect is a small scatter of firms within each strategic
group and a larger difference between the strategic groups. And this
is exactly what one finds, numerically, if one perturbs the profit
functions asymmetrically in a small way (see Figure 3). This pertur-
bation captures the uncertainties in estimating the profit function as
well as the slight intrinsic differences between firms.
Insert Figure 3 about here
5 .0 Conclusion and Discussion
This study follows the spirit of numerous others on the subject of
strategic groups. However, the basic thrust of this study is more
fundamental than the identification problem. Four questions regarding
the existence of strategic groups, limits on the number of strategic
groups, characterisation of an industry equilibrium with strategic
groups and posture of individual firms within a strategic group have
been raised and answered, subject to the limitations of the assumptions
behind the monopolistic competitive model used.
As an answer to the question on existence, the nature of the objec-
tives of firms as well as the interactions between variables in the
market can force the firms to split into various strategic groups.
There will necessarily be some dominant strategies and firms should
compare their existing strategies to those that may persist as dominant
ones in a stable equilibrium. Otherwise, they may not achieve the
maximum potential utility gains. From a public policy point of view,
the existence of strategic groups and dominant strategies can help
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policy makers decide whether to intervene or allow the market forces
to direct the industry structure.
Regarding the limit on the number of strategic groups in a struc-
turally stable equilibrium, it has been proven that the extent of stra-
tegic diversification is equal to the number of uncontrollable variables
plus one. The obvious question that arises is: what is the appropri-
ate number of uncontrollable variables to be chosen? Clearly, this
depends upon the industry under investigation. For example, in more
finance oriented industries, industry averages of seven factors namely,
financial leverage, capital turnover, return on investment, inventory
turnover, receivables turnover and liquidity and cash positions, could
be chosen as the uncontrollable variables (Chen and Shimerda, 1981).
Then, given the uncontrollable variables, the instability theorem pre-
dicts a definite upper bound (i.e., 8) on the number of strategic groups,
Given the existence of strategic groups and a limit on the number
of them, how can one describe the industry via aggregate measures?
Four aggregate indices have been suggested here, namely, the strategic
concentration ratio, SCR, the strategic comprehensive index, SCI, the
strategic distance matrix, SDM, and the aggregate strategic distance,
ASD. The first two try to capture the market share distribution among
the groups while the latter two measure strategic distances and poten-
tial mobility barriers that may exist among strategic groups.
The final question relates to the relative position of a firm
within a strategic group. The four indices mentioned above could very
well be used to describe the structure within a group. The example in
Section 4 has also shown that once sufficiently small asymmetries are
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introduced into the model, through either estimation differences or
structural differences, the essential strategic group equilibrium per-
sists. This is typified in terms of a diversity of strategies scattered
around a core group strategy rather than the existence of homogeneity
within the group.
In summary, this paper has pursued a more fundamental route in
4
analysing the subject of strategic groups. Perspectives on the four
issues raised should prove useful to researchers in the business policy
and the industrial organisation area. Clearly there is a lot of scope
in using the methodology presented here. In particular, market forces,
both consumer and producer, are modelled to develop a theory to explain
how and why strategic groups evolve rather than to just describe them
(which is important in itself).
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Footnotes
This assumption is a benchmark of symmetry, which is somewhat
unrealistic. The consequences of relaxing this assumption to achieve
greater asymmetry is addressed at the end of Section 3.
2
Both measures are standard norms in Euclidean space and are
equivalent in the sense that all properties depicted by one measure
will also be depicted by the other. The first measure is called the
absolute value norm and the second, the L -norm.
3
The calculation of the distribution of the firms in each group is
as follows: given that the prices charged the two groups A and B are
2.25 and 4 respectively with the average being 3, let q be the propor-
tion of firms in group A and (1-q) that in group B. Then,
2.25 * q + 4 * (1-q) = 3
which implies q = 57.15% and (1-q) = 42.85%.
4
Another working paper by Kumar et al. (1984) addresses the issue
of how the methodology can be adapted to identify and form strategic
groups within industries.
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Appendix
For the given model, the strategic variables for the firm are
(P., CI., AD., R&D., Q.), the uncontrollable variables are (AP, ACI,
1 1 111 '
AAD, AR&D, AQ) and the common utility function facing each firm is
U(P., CI., AD., R&D., Q., AP, ACI, AAD, AR&D, AQ)
which is continuously dif ferentiable. Each firm maximizes its utility
function over its strategic variables taking the industry average
variables as given.
Definition ; A mixed strategy based on k pure strategies is given by
(P., CI., AD., R&D., Q., w.). ,) where o>. is the probabilitv placed on
i 11 ill i=l l
the ith strategy (P., CI., AD., R&D., Q.) with
l l l l l
k
u) = (u
, ..., a) ) e ftk
= CCu,, .... U,| 2 V. = 1)>.
i=l
Definition : The reaction set at (AP, ACI, AAD AR&D, AQ), denoted by
R(AP, ACI, AAD, AR&D, AQ), is the set of (P., CI., AD., R&D., Q.) which
globally maximizes the utility function at (AP, ACI, AAD, AR&D, AQ).
Definition : A symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium based on k
k it x x x x V
pure strategies is given by ((P., CI., AD., R&D., Q., m.) , AP, ACI,
AAD, AR&D, AQ) satisfying for all ui = (w ..., Ml) g ft,
X K. IS. y
-2-
jU Hk ^t -^
-Je
Z U) U(P., CI., AD., R&D., Q., AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*) 2
i=l
* * A A * if
Z oi U(P
i
,
CI
i ,
AD
i ,
R&D
t ,
Q AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*),
i=l
E to. P. = AP*, E u. CI. = ACI, Z 'J. AD. = AAD, Z to.R&D. = AR&D,
1-1 *
l 1-1 * * 1-1
X X
1-1
X X
k
*
S oi.Q. = AQ,
. ,
li1=1
where
* *
a)* - (u , . .., cok ) e J2k ,
* * * * *
(P. , CI. , AD. , R&D.
,
Q.) e
l l l 11
and R(AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*)
The above definition implies that there are k strategies
* * * * * k(P., CI., AD., R&D., Q.)._, which are the best responses given
(AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*) and that each of these strategies has a
*
corresponding probability to. associated with it. This probability
go* = (oj
, ..., oj.) is the one that gives the highest expected profits
compared to all other probability measures and also satisfies the con-
sistency condition that the expected or average value of the best
response strategy is indeed (AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*).
This equilibrium implies that around a small neighborhood of
(AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*), there exist k local maxima and with the
added assumption of positive probabilities associated with each utility
maximizing strategy, they are isolated. Also, the utility levels at
each of these local maxima, at (AP*, ACI*, AAD*, AR&D*, AQ*), is the
s ame . Let
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x. = (P., CI., AD., R&D., Q.), i=l, . .., k
1 1 l l li
and y = (AP, ACT, AAD, AR&D, AQ)
3 k-1
and D: R + R defined bv
D(y) = (U(x.(y),y) - D(x.Al (y),y),i i+l
x.(y) £ S(y),
j=l, ..., k)
where S(y) is the set of local maxima at the point y = (AP, ACI, AAD,
AR&D, AQ). Then, in a small neighborhood of y* = (A?*, ACI*, AAD*,
AR&D*, AQ*), D(y) is well defined and D(y*) = 0.
Now consider all perturbations U, of the function U such that the
values of the function U., its first and second derivatives can be
made as close as needed to those corresponding values of U by choosing
X small enough. To ensure the stability of the equilibrium using
profit function U, it is necessary to demonstrate the existence of a
similar equilibrium, close by and unique in a neighborhood of the
original equilibrium, for all perturbations U, , with X in a some open
neighborhood of the value (where it is assumed that U
n
= U) . Three
conditions have to be satisfied for such an existence, namely
(1) the local maxima sets S(y) and S,(y) must be close to each other
in a neighborhood of y* and the cardinality of S,(y) should be
equal to k.
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(2) if condition (1) is satisfied, then the profit difference function
D, is well defined in this neighborhood of y*. Then, it is neces-
A
* * * * * *
sary to show the existence of y, = (AP,, ACI,, AAD,, AR&D,, AQ,)
close to y*, in the neighborhood were D, is defined, such that
d
x
<t;> - 0.
(3) Then it is necessary to ensure the existence of a probability vec-
tor a), such that the expected value of the best response strategy
(P.,, CI.,, AD.,, R&D.,, Q.,) is indeed (AP,, ACI,, AAD,, AR&D,, AQ,).
Condition (1) can be shown to be true through an application of the
implicit function theorem and using the fact that the local maxima are
non-degenerate critical points (Guillerain and Pollack (1974)). It is
the second condition which leads us to the limitation on the value that
k can take.
Proof of the Instabilitv Theorem:
Consider the case where k
_>_ 7. Then, the continuous map D, whose
domain is some compact subset A of the neighborhood of y* and whose
k-1
range is a subset B of R , satisfies D(y*) = 0. It should be noted
that D is uniformly continuous and B is a compact set of measure zero
k-1
in R . Now either is on the boundary of set 3 or not.
If is on the boundary, then there exists a sufficiently small
vector translation D, such that is not contained in the range of
this perturbation D..
If is in the interior of B, then approximate D (which is uni-
formly continuous) uniformly by means of a piecewise continuous linear
function, D. Note that this is a perturbation of D. For this
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approximation, is either in its range or not. If is not in its
range, then this perturbation suffices and let D, = D. If is in its
range, then it must be on its boundary (since D is piecewise linear)
and therefore a sufficiently small vector translation D, of D can get
rid of the in its range.
Thus, we can construct a perturbation D, of D either through pure
vector translation or through a uniform approximation or through a
combination of both, such that no y exists with D.(y) = 0«
n



